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In his book Leaderless Jihad,1 Marc Sageman claims, as the title indicates, that Jihad in 
the modern world is changing from a centrally organized and structured activity into a 
more dispersed, decentralized movement in which small groups self-organize to carry 
out attacks. Bruce Hoffman has challenged this claim and Sageman’s way of supporting 
it, arguing that al Qaeda central is alive and well.2 As is often the case in such disputes, 
in so far as the substance is concerned, there is truth on both sides.3 The kind of self-
organizing groups that Sageman describes do exist, and sometimes get help from 
overseas, but are not the only Jihad threat we face.   
As this debate rumbled on and became part of the debate over what to do about 
Afghanistan,4 two things became clear. First, neither Hoffman nor Sageman, or others 
weighing in, considered the strategic consequences of the network structure they are 
disputing about. There is a tendency to assume, for example, that networks are powerful 
organizational structures inherently difficult for industrial-age bureaucracies like the 
United States government to deal with. Sageman alludes to this larger argument by 
mentioning the “difficulty of national bureaucracies trying to combat terrorist market 
forces,” although Sageman does recognize some of the limits of so-called leaderless 
movements (pp. 145, 146).5 In fact, networks, or decentralized organizations and 
activities, have weaknesses; and hierarchies, or centralized organizations, have 
strengths that on balance give the latter distinct advantages against both al Qaeda 
central and the al Qaeda movement. 6 
The second point that became clear was that not enough attention had been paid to 
the claims that Sageman made about the role of the internet in the development of what 
he calls the leaderless Jihad movement. These claims are clear and quite strong. 
Sageman claims it is the internet that “has dramatically transformed the structure and 
dynamic of the evolving threat of global Islamic terrorism by changing the nature of 
terrorists’ interactions… Starting around 2004, communication and inspiration shifted 
from face-to-face interactions…to interaction on the internet” (p. 109). Assessing 
Sageman’s claim is important because if he is right, it would suggest that we switch 
attention and resources to combating digital recruitment. If he is wrong, then this would 
be a waste of resources. 
As Sageman presents his argument, it depends on two interrelated arguments. The 
first is that web sites presenting Jihadist propaganda or bomb-making instructions and 
other operational advice are not the engine driving extremist Islam. Sageman points out, 
for example, that bombs built only with instructions from web sites have either not 
exploded or have had limited effects (p. 113). More important, he discounts the effect of 
the propaganda on web sites in encouraging radicalization and commitment to the 
extremist cause. He denies that images found on these web sites have “intrinsic power to 
influence people into taking arms against the West.” Such images, Sageman claims, 
“merely reinforce already made-up minds” (p. 114). Sageman offers no evidence to 
support his denial of the importance of the images. What he does instead is to offer his 
TUCKER, SAGEMAN ON JIHAD 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
2 
second argument: the interactivity of the internet (particularly forums and chat rooms) 
is changing human relationships in a revolutionary way and hence, he implicitly 
assumes, must be changing the way those who become extremists interact online. In 
support of this claim, Sageman cites one article and six terrorism cases he says show the 
revolutionary impact of the internet and substantiate his claim that the internet “has 
dramatically transformed the structure and dynamic of the evolving threat of global 
Islamic terrorism.” 
Before examining Sageman’s argument and his evidence in detail, we should note two 
general points. First, even if Sageman is right about the effects of internet fora and chat 
rooms, it would not prove that the propaganda images on web sites are not aiding 
radicalization. Sageman simply denies that they are, without offering any evidence, and 
presents a counter-argument about the web. There is no logical connection between the 
truth of his counter-argument and the falsehood of the claims about the propaganda 
value of the images on the web. Both could be true. In fact, as we shall see, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the web sites do aid in radicalization. Second, we should note 
that six cases is a very small sample. It is not reassuring to see someone who claims to 
proceed scientifically as others have not (p. 13), basing such large and strong claims on 
such a small sample. Sound generalization is always a problem in terrorism studies 
because terrorism is such a rare event that we seldom have a large number of well-
understood cases to base our claims on. Any scientific or even simply reasonable and 
candid analysis of terrorism should acknowledge this problem, however, and be modest 
in the claims it makes. 
We can begin the detailed examination of Sageman’s claims as he does by considering 
the effect of the internet on human relations in general. He states that “people’s 
relationships are being completely transformed through computer-mediated 
communications.” Sageman offers no support for this claim, except to make additional 
undocumented claims, for example, about the effects of anonymity. He proceeds, 
however, to draw conclusions about terrorism from these undocumented claims, 
arguing that the trust and intensity of emotion that is necessary for the sacrifices that 
terrorism requires can be generated online. At this point he states that “online feelings 
are stronger in almost every measurement than offline feelings. This is a robust finding 
that has been duplicated many times” (p. 114)  
In support of this broad claim, Sageman cites one article: a review of research on the 
effects of the internet on social life.7 The article does not state that “online feelings are 
stronger in every measurement than offline feelings” or that this is a robust finding. It 
states rather that in two experiments “those who met first on the Internet liked each 
other more than those who met first face-to-face.”8 (It also reports that, depending on 
assumptions about the social context, interactions on the internet can be negative, 
displaying lack of trust, for example.9) Overall, the article offers no support for the claim 
that the internet is transforming social life. For example, the article reports that 
research supports “the view that membership and participation in Internet groups can 
have powerful effects on one’s self and identity” but it also reports that “group processes 
and effects unfold over the Internet in much the same way as they do in traditional 
venues.”10 Instead of supporting Sageman’s claims, the article suggests that Sageman is 
wrong in stressing the transformational character of the internet. It reports that people 
tend to take online relationships offline into the non-internet world, for example.11 This 
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suggests that whatever the internet’s advantages, individuals still prefer face-to-face 
social life to online social life. Indeed, the article reports that “international bankers and 
college students alike considered off-line communication more beneficial to establishing 
close social (as opposed to work) relationships.”12   
Other research on the social effects of the internet published since the one article that 
Sageman refers to does not support Sageman’s claim that the internet is transforming 
people’s relationships. First, the internet does not appear to be displacing people’s social 
activity. People who use the internet are not less likely to have other forms of social 
contact. Internet use “appears to expand activity engagement rather than replace 
previous personal channel contacts [including face-to-face contact] or media use.”13 This 
research suggests that if Islamic extremists are replacing face-to-face contact with 
internet mediated contact, as Sageman claims, then they are doing something that 
others who use the internet are not doing.  
Other research offers a possible explanation for the continuing importance of face-to-
face interaction. A review of research on the social consequences of internet use among 
adolescents finds that such use is correlated with improvements in “social 
connectedness and well-being” but only when the internet is used “to maintain existing 
friendships.” When adolescents use the internet “to form new contacts and talk with 
strangers, the positive effects do not hold.”14 Whatever the reason for this, it does not 
seem to support Sageman’s claims about the transforming effects of the internet. 
Moreover, it casts doubt on his unsupported claim that strangers can form bonds of 
trust online as effectively as they can face-to-face. We should note, however, as the 
review of research just quoted does, that “internet research is still young and does not 
yet allow us to draw decisive conclusions.”15 
If research on internet use does not support Sageman, neither does the other 
evidence he uses, the six cases he refers to in his book. The table below summarizes 
what Sageman tell us about his six cases. 
 




 F2F Internet  
Crevice X X  
Madrid bombing16   Yes 
Hofstad X X  
Cairo bombing   Yes 
Operation Osage X X  
German bombing X X  
 
After presenting this evidence in narrative form, Sageman states “this clearly shows the 
change from offline to online interaction in the evolution of the threat” (p. 110). In fact, 
it does not. In two of the six cases that Sageman mentions, he tells us only that the 
terrorists got support from the internet (an inspirational document in the case of the 
Madrid bombing and bomb-making instructions in the case of the Cairo bombing). 
There is nothing new here. Terrorists did not begin using the internet for support in 
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2004. The 9/11 bombers used it, as did others before them. More important, “support” 
is not “interaction,” and it is interaction among terrorists that Sageman says the internet 
has “dramatically transformed.” Interaction did occur on the internet in the other four 
cases, but it also occurred face-to-face. How do we know which kind of interaction was 
more important? If terrorists are meeting as they have always done and then 
communicating online, which would be consistent with research on internet use, this 
does not suggest a dramatic change in terrorists’ interactions. It is important to note, 
then, that only in one case (the German bombing) does Sageman tell us the terrorists 
met first online. 
The reason Sageman does not mention terrorists meeting first online in the other 
cases is that it did not happen. In all the other cases, it appears the terrorists met first 
face-to-face.17 In fact, the evidence suggests terrorists tend to be friends, acquaintances 
or relatives, who then become radicalized and carry out an attack.18 In the course of this 
process, they may contact others online but Sageman presents no evidence that these 
online contacts are more important than the face-to-face contacts. In fact, the evidence 
suggests they were not. The groups formed face-to-face and then, to one degree or 
another, used the internet. But there is no evidence the internet was necessary for group 
formation, subsequent radicalization or carrying out an attack. The internet may make it 
easier to find accomplices in geographically dispersed places, coordinate with them, and 
get plans for a bomb, but terrorists did all these things before the internet existed. The 
internet may allow terrorists to improve their efficiency but the cases Sageman 
mentions do not show a transformation in how terrorists interact.19 Moreover, in three 
of the six cases that Sageman mentions, the face-to-face contact first occurred in a 
Mosque or an Islamic religious group, exactly the sort of thing that Sageman argues was 
not important after 2004 (pp. 109, 110). Only one of the cases Sageman mentions (the 
German bombing) supports his claim that the internet has changed interactions among 
terrorists. 
What about cases that have occurred since Sageman’s book appeared in 2008? There 
have been a number of cases over the past several years.20 Full details on these cases are 
not available but we can look at what we know about a few of the more prominent ones. 
Al-Shabab, an Islamic extremist group in Somalia, has apparently been recruiting 
among first- or second-generation Somali immigrants in the United States. It uses 
videos on the internet but also face-to-face contact. Some of those recruited and 
subsequently arrested have reported attending secret meetings, meeting people on 
basketball courts or at Mosques, or in chat rooms online. Al-Shabab also uses what one 
report described as networks of friends to help its recruiting efforts.21 Bryant Neal Vinas, 
an American citizen, converted to Islam in 2004, according to one report, because of al 
Qaeda videos he viewed online. He then attended a mosque, which members of the 
extremist group al Muhajiroun were known to frequent. He subsequently traveled to 
Pakistan, where a friend helped him to get in touch with al Qaeda. During his time in 
Pakistan, Vinas met others who hoped to carry out extremist attacks. Some had been 
recruited in Belgium in person by an al Qaeda recruiter, who also used the internet to 
recruit others.22 Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant, was arrested in connection with 
an investigation into a possible terrorist plot in September 2009. Although details in 
this case are particularly sparse, Zazi is reported to have attended a mosque with his 
family as he was growing up and possibly to have joined with others who left the mosque 
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when the Imam preached against al Qaeda. Another report claims he was in touch by 
phone with al Qaeda members in Pakistan.23 Four men from Newburgh, New York 
arrested for plotting to bomb a synagogue in New York City had prison and a mosque in 
common but no reported use of the internet or contact with al Qaeda recruiters.24 
Hosam Maher Husein Smadi met someone working for the FBI online and subsequently 
plotted with him and others working for the FBI to carry out a terrorist attack. The 
informants and Smadi did meet face-to-face while the planning the attack.25 
While sketchy and limited, none of the information we have on these recent plots 
suggests anything like what Sageman claims. Internet images sometimes appear to 
assist if not initiate the movement to extremism. Chat rooms play a role but rarely are 
the place terrorists first meet; face-to-face contact predominates. Mosques and other 
physical gathering places figure more prominently than the internet. In this limited 
sample, the internet appears to be a useful but by no means a transforming or even 
dominant means of mobilizing recruits for extremism. This is actually a point Sageman 
comes close to making himself at the end of his chapter on the internet (p. 121).  
In showing the complex interaction of social relations, the internet and recruiting, all 
of these cases show a marked resemblance to the summary description one analyst of 
the Madrid bombing has offered of those who carried out that attack: 
 
It was in Mosques, worship sites, countryside gatherings and private residences 
where most of the members of the Madrid bombing network adopted extremist 
views.  A few adopted a violent conception of Islam while in prison.  The internet 
was clearly relevant as a radicalization tool, especially among those who were 
radicalized after 2003, but it was more importantly a complement to face-to-face 
interactions.26 
 
Again, none of this suggests that Sageman’s claims about the internet and 
terrorism are true. 
Further evidence suggesting that Sageman’s claims are wrong comes from research 
done on the recruitment of foreign fighters from the Middle East and North Africa.  
Analysis of data captured in Iraq shows that 97 percent of a group of 177 foreign fighters 
met their recruitment coordinator “through a social (84 percent), family (6 percent) or 
religious (6 percent) connection.” Only 3.4 percent of the 177 foreign fighters mentioned 
the internet. Furthermore, when countries of origin for the foreign fighters were 
compared to the number of internet users in those countries, “more internet users 
correlated with lower numbers of fighters.” Finally, analysis shows that there is no 
correlation between countries that access extremist web sites and countries that produce 
foreign fighters.27 If the internet were an important tool of mobilization and 
recruitment, we would expect to see a correlation between accessing extremist web sites 
and numbers of foreign fighters.    
What holds true for the Middle East and North Africa might not hold true for other 
places with greater general rates of access to the internet and less of a supporting social 
and cultural network for extremists to rely on. In these places, one night argue, the 
internet might be the only place where would-be radicals could find the contacts and 
encouragement they need to join the extremist movement. Yet what is true of the Middle 
East and North Africa appears to be true of North America, judging by the cases 
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Sageman cites and the additional cases discussed above. “The internet plays a minor 
radicalization role…. Conversations, sermons, print and radio communication, family 
and social networks present foreign fighters with local justification for joining the 
jihad.”28 This finding accords with research that finds internet use tends to “activate the 
active;” that is, promote engagement and activity among those already inclined that way 
and focus attention on the local community.29   
One must conclude, therefore, both that Sageman offers no evidence to support his 
claim the internet is transforming how terrorists interact and there is little evidence 
elsewhere to support this claim. Perhaps over time, the evidence will emerge. In the 
meantime, we are stuck with the difficult task of focusing “on the social and religious 
networks” from which extremists emerge if we want “to interrupt or fragment face-to-
face recruitment.”30   
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